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Conflicts over sacred values may be particularly difficult to resolve. Because sacred values are nonfungible with
material values, standard attempts to negotiate, such as offering material incentives to compromise, often backfire,
increasing moral outrage and support for violent action. We present studies with Palestinians in the West Bank and
Gaza demonstrating three other ways sacred values may make conflict more intractable, focusing on what we call
devoted actors, people who regard issues central to the Israel–Palestine conflict as sacred values.We show that devoted
actors (1) were less amenable to social influence, (2) perceived conflict-related events in the past as well as expected
events in the future to be temporally closer, and (3) were blind to individual opportunities to escape the conflict.
These results suggest that sacred values may affect decision making in a number of ways, which, when combined,
contribute to common defense and continuation of conflict.
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Some conflicts appear to be extraordinarily difficult
to resolve, despite apparent solutions that outside
observers regard as obvious and rationally prefer-
able for both parties. The conflict between Israel and
the Palestinians is one salient example. The broad
outline of the solution to this conflict—a division
of the land and the creation of two states—was first
proposed by the British Mandatory power and later
approved by the United Nations following World
War II.According toopinionpolls, a permanentpar-
tition of the land roughly along the 1948 armistice
borders is currently endorsed by most Israelis and
Palestinians. Why are conflicts like this so difficult
to resolve? Dominant opinion within political sci-
ence argues that wars are best understood through
the lens of instrumental rationality,1–3 and that ap-
parent intractability despite the presence of a clear
solution is caused by things such as imperfect infor-
mation or commitment problems.4,5
In this article, we summarize a body of work and
present some new empirical findings that suggest
the above reasoning is insufficient. This is because
many human conflicts involve things that we and
others have called sacred values.6 When people con-
strue issues central to a conflict as sacred values,
they become devoted actors:7 avoiding the rational
logic of realpolitik,8 game-theoretic analyses,9 or the
marketplace (i.e., rational actors seeking the most
cost-effective means to achieve a specific goal). In-
stead, they make decisions about their sacred values
using a rule-bound and emotionally arousingmoral
logic that is insensitive to quantity and resists ma-
terial trade-offs.10–13 Moreover, once people decide
to engage in violent conflict in defense of such val-
ues, their moral commitment to violence may itself
become a sacred value.14
The difference between devoted actor and ra-
tional actor perspectives does not concern the fa-
miliar cognitive limitations on rational informa-
tion processing,15–17 which may be exacerbated by
stressful situations in times of conflict.18,19 Rather,
devoted actors treat sacred values as being above
doi: 10.1111/nyas.12275
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utility calculations and may make decisions that
appear absurd when viewed through the lens of
the rational-actor model. In previous work, we and
others have provided empirical support from real-
world conflict areas for several ways in which de-
voted actors driven by sacred values deviate from
rational actors in their willingness to sacrifice self-
interest, including (1) violation of transitivity in
preferences;20,21 (2) insensitivity or reverse sensitiv-
ity to quantity;14,22,23 (3) immunity to trade-offs24,25
coupled with a backfire effect, where offers of ma-
terial incentives or disincentives to give up sacred
values lead to emotional retrenchment—including
anger, disgust and moral outrage—and heightened
refusal to compromise or negotiate;11,26–29 (4) a
rule-bound logic of moral appropriateness to do
what is morally right no matter the likely risks or
rewards;30–33 and (5) brain-imaging patterns con-
sistent with processing sacred values as rules rather
than as calculations of costs and consequences, and
with processing perceived violations of sacred values
as emotionally agitating.34,35
A key difficulty in motivating and sustaining col-
lective action in the long run involves immunizing
the group from individual defections. Monitoring
and punishment of free riders and norm violators
provides one set ofmeans;36 however, a punishment
regime is often costly to maintain and does little to
eliminate inducements to defect that become at-
tractive whenever and wherever vigilance is lax.37
Work on religious rhetoric and rituals suggest that
these aspects of religionhelp tobindgroupmembers
to long-termmutual commitments by internalizing
religious beliefs into values adhered to through self-
policing.38,39 Once internalized, such values appear
to be less subject to the pressures and enticements
of the here-and-now, such as the opinion of others
and the lure of short-term goals and advantages.40
Accordingly, in this current work we seek to test and
confirm these conjectures beyond the purely reli-
gious realm, by providing preliminary evidence for
three additional and complementary characteristics
of devoted actors driven by internalized sacred val-
ues, namely resistance to (1) social influence, (2)
temporal discounting, and (3) exit strategies. We
hypothesize that internalized sacred values should
be less susceptible to social and temporal pressures
than other socially, politically, ormorally important
values and norms. Moreover, sacred values should
be relatively immune to personally beneficial in-
ducements to trade off or give up those values,
even if those inducements include implementation
of other important values and norms. A success-
ful demonstration of these ideas will also illuminate
novel ways in which sacred values affect the decision
making of devoted actors, and prolong intergroup
conflicts.
The divide between the sacred and the profane
has drawn the interest of social scientists for some
time.42–44 But until recently, research in judgment
and decision making has concerned itself almost
exclusively with how people make decisions in the
profane or nonsacred domain, such as economic de-
cision making. Over the last decade, more attention
has been paid to how people form judgments and
make decisions over sacred, compared to economic,
values.6,24 A sacred valuemight be operationally de-
fined as anything that people refuse to treat as fun-
gible with material or economic goods, for example
when people refuse to compromise over an issue re-
gardless of the costs or benefits.11 Sacred issues may
be religious but often are not,10 and research shows
that issueswithout obvious religious contentmay be
sacralized.45 While some have suggested that sacred
values may be easily reneged in the face of material
pressures,25 history suggests otherwise. People will
burn themselves alive, kill, and risk the lives of their
families and loved ones in the name of a sacred val-
ues like “nation,” “communism,” “democracy,” or
“god.”
Just as many things can be construed in moral
versus nonmoral terms with consequences for judg-
ment and decision making,40 so too many things
can be both everyday aspects of life and sacred val-
ues depending on context: for instance, the Ganges
can be a place to bathe and a holy body of water,
Jerusalem can be a place to live and a holy city.
The parallel with moral construal suggests possi-
ble communalities between sacred values andmoral
convictions,41 which have yet to be explored empir-
ically. One strength of our conceptualization, how-
ever, is that sacred values are clearly circumscribed
because they are narrowly defined.
Empirical research conducted in real-world po-
litical conflict demonstrates some ways in which
sacred values can influence human conflict. Gin-
ges et al.11 found, in a series of studies in the
West Bank and Gaza, that adding material incen-
tives to peace deals that involve compromises over
sacred values can backfire. They presented Israeli
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settlers and Palestinians with realistic peace deals
that offered a two-state solution, but also included
compromises over issues that were considered sa-
cred by many of the participants such as the right
of return (for Palestinians) and giving up land
(for Israeli settlers). All participants were presented
with deals exchanging an important value for
peace. Using a between-subjects experimental de-
sign, some participants were presented with this
straightforward deal (e.g., “land for peace”), other
participants were given some type of added ma-
terial offer to sweeten the deal (such as money to
help their nation or the promise of a life free of
violence). If the deal did not invoke a participant’s
sacred value (as with Israelis for whom land was
not sacred) the deal was still painful (most did not
agree to it), but economic incentives produced the
expected result: the material sweetener decreased
anger, disgust, and support for violent opposition
to the deal. In contrast, if the deal did invoke a value
sacred to participants, they responded negatively to
the materially improved deal; that is, the material
sweetener increased anger, disgust, and support for
violent opposition.
The backfire effect has been replicated in other
contexts (for reviews, see Refs. 10, 12, and 14), such
as Iran (nuclear energy program27,28), Indonesia
(Sharia law23), and the Muslim–Hindu conflict in
India (around Babri Masjid and Kashmir29). This
effectmakes sense, consideringDurkheim’s43 obser-
vation that “the sacred and the profane are always
and everywhere conceived by the human intellect
as separate genera . . . the mind experiences a deep
repugnance aboutmingling” the sacred and the pro-
fane (p. 36).
Other research demonstrates that when political
violence is perceived to be morally mandated, as
when sacred values are threatened or violated, sup-
port for violence can become a sacred value. When
this happens, people demonstrate the same type of
judgments and decisions about political violence as
they do about other sacred values. Their support for
violent action is insensitive to the scope of success,12
whether this refers to the number of hostages that
might be rescued through the use of force,14 or the
number of the enemy that might be killed.20 In one
experiment, Palestinian participants intuitively be-
lieved it was inappropriate for the family of a mar-
tyr to request financial compensation, and themore
compensation a hypothetical family requested, the
more inappropriate the requestwas seen as being—a
finding reminiscent of the backfire effect.20
In this article, we describe two studies conducted
in theWest Bank and Gaza that add to the emerging
pictureof howsacredvalues shapehumanconflict in
a way that contributes to its continuation. In Study
1, we explore the topic of social influence, asking if
devoted actors, this is, people who consider a given
issue in a conflict (e.g., right of return) as sacred,
are less likely to be swayed by social influence, such
as changing public support for their sacred value. In
Study 2, we investigate if devoted actors experience
events related to their existential conflicts, whether
negative events in the past (e.g., tragic defeat) or
positive events in the future (e.g., expected victory),
as closer in time than other historical events, effec-
tively diminishing temporal discounting. We also
probe to see if sacred values blind devoted actors to
possible ways of exiting the conflict.
Study 1: Sacred values are resistant to
social influence
In intergroupconflicts, actors are subject todifferent
forms of social influence as stakeholders attempt to
influence each other. On the one hand, one group
might try to intimidate the other into reprioritiz-
ing conflict-relevant issues. On the other, militants
might be subject to in-group pressures to give up
certain values in exchange for a more peaceful ex-
istence. One established finding within social psy-
chology concerns the way people tend to conform
to the opinions and beliefs of group members, even
when those opinions are clearly incorrect.47–49 Peo-
ple can also be influenced by out-group opinion.
For example, Malhotra and Ginges50 showed that
the willingness of Israelis to vote for a peace deal
was influenced both by the extent to which other
Israelis supported the deal, and the level of agree-
ment between Israeli and Palestinian opinion about
the deal. Voting intentions were highest when both
sides believed the deal was good or bad. The effect
was mediated by perceived deal implementability,
suggesting that people believed that balanced out-
comes (both sideswinor lose in equalmeasure)were
more likely to lead to peace. Thus, people in conflict
situations may also be influenced by the opinion of
the other side.
In this experiment, we investigated whether the
sacredness of issues in conflict may be relatively
less vulnerable to social influence. Our experiment
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focused on an issue that we believed, based on dis-
cussions with Palestinian leaders, might prove to be
an emerging sacred value for the Palestinian people;
that of Palestinian sovereignty over the borders and
airspace of a future Palestinian state (sovereignty).
We asked participants to rank order the importance
of eight virtues including this value. Before rank-
ing, participants were exposed to an experimen-
tal manipulation where they were reminded of (1)
the conflict with Israel in general (control condi-
tion), (2) Israeli rejection of Palestinian sovereignty
over borders and airspace, or (3) Palestinian sup-
port for this issue. We predicted that for those who
do not claim this value as sacred, its relative rank-
ing would be influenced by in-group and out-group
opinion. In contrast, devoted actors (i.e., those who
do claim the value as sacred) would be relatively re-
sistant to social influence (Hypothesis 1a). We also
included an already normative sacred value in this
study: the right of Palestinian refugees to return
(right of return). The right of return has been a
central tenet of the Palestinian independencemove-
ment since its inception. In previous studies we
found that offering material incentives to give up
this value backfired both for devoted actors and
for people who did not categorize it as a sacred
value.11 Thus, we predicted that the relative ranking
of this established sacred value would bemore resis-
tant to social influence for nondevoted actors than




We surveyed a representative sample (n = 1200)
of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza with
the help of the Palestinian Center for Policy and
Survey Research (PCPSR). The sampling proce-
dure went through three stages: first, population
locations (clusters or counting areas) were ran-
domly drawn using probability proportionate to
size; second, households from these locations were
randomly selected; third, one person was selected
randomly frompersons over 18 years in these house-
holds using Kish household tables. This sampling
method leads to a self-weighting sample, which is
representative of the population. Participants were
interviewed at home, face to face; they were on aver-
age 38 years old (ranging from 18 to 87 years); half
of themwere women (51%). Sixty-five percent lived
Table 1. Values and proportion of participants consid-
ering them sacred
Value Sacred
Belief in God and Mohammed (pbuh)
as His Prophet
–
Jihad against our enemies –
Protecting the family 91%
Fairness to others 86%
Living by Sharia law 78%
Defending the right of return 78%
Protecting Palestinian rights over
Jerusalem
86%
Sovereign rights over Palestinian
airspace and borders
84%
in theWest Bank while the other 35% lived in Gaza;
45% self-identified as refugees.
Measures
Sovereignty and the right of return are both impor-
tant values for Palestinians; in fact they are sacred
for most Palestinians. Asking them about the im-
portance of these values directly would lead to a
ceiling effect. To address this issue, we pitted these
values against other values (e.g., protecting your
family), which also are sacred for most Palestinians
(see Table 1 for a complete list). We asked partici-
pants: “Which of these things do you feel Palestini-
ans should value the most? Please rank in order of
importance the following things (use “1” as themost
important and “8” as least important; if more than
one item has the same importance in your mind,
then give those items the same rank number).” This
measure allowed us to assess the importance of our
target values relative to other important values. Ef-
fectively, participantswere required tomake a trade-
off between values important to them, resulting in
a measure of relative (as opposed to absolute) im-
portance of the target values. However, participants
could assign the same rank to values they considered
equally important.
Procedure
We ran our experiment within a larger survey
on political attitudes and opinions. Participants
were randomly assigned to one of only five con-
ditions (n = 240, each): we asked participants
about their opinion on either the Israeli–Palestinian
conflict in general (control), Palestinians’ support
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of control over borders and airspace (sovereignty:
in-group support) and Israeli opposition to this
demand (sovereignty: out-group opposition) and
Palestinians’ support of the right of return (return:
in-group support) and its rejection by Israelis (re-
turn: out-group opposition) to test Hypothesis 1a.
In the control condition, participants were asked
to “Please think about the conflict between Pales-
tine and Israel today. Which of these following
words best describe how you feel when thinking
about the conflict?” They were then given a list of
emotion words (e.g., sadness) to pick from. In the
“in-group support” conditions, participants were
told: “As you know, Palestinians feel very strongly
about [securing the refugees right to return to their
original lands, towns, and villages/reclaiming Pales-
tinian sovereignty over their own airspace and bor-
ders].” They were then asked how they felt about
Palestinian support of the given issue. Similarly,
in the “out-group opposition” conditions, partic-
ipants were told: “As you know, the Israelis feel
very strongly [aboutPalestinians’ right of return and
have rejected it since the creation of Israel/that they
need to deny Palestinian control over the airspace
and borders of Palestine].” They were then asked
about their feelings about this opposition by Israelis.
Subsequently, we presented participants with a
filler question, which was not analyzed: they were
asked to rank a number of public figures according
towhether Palestinian children should admire them
as heroes (ranging from populists like Ahmadinejad
to sportsmen like Ronaldinho). We then presented
themwith ourmeasure of the relative importance of
sovereignty and right of return (described above). In
a different part of the survey we assessed if these val-
ues were sacred for the participant following Baron
and Spranca’s approach:24 we asked them to indicate
if “in extreme circumstances it would be permissible
for Palestinians to compromise” on the value. They
were given the followingoptions to respond: “I think
this definitely needs to happen,” “I do not object to
this,” “I think this should be done only if it brings
great benefits,” “I think this should be done only to
avoid some great loss,” and “This shouldn’t be done
no matter how great the benefits or losses.” Partici-
pants were categorized as considering a given value
as sacred when they picked the last option, leading
to a dichotomousmeasure of sacredness.We did not
assess sacredness of “belief in god and Mohammad
(pbuh) as his prophet” and “jihad against our ene-
mies” to prevent offense and to protect our partic-
ipants, because admitting to compromise on these




Across all conditions, the most common emotions
reported by the participants were sadness (23%),
anger (21%), and humiliation (19%). Emotional
reactions differed significantly across conditions
( 2(32) = 441.9, P < 0.001). While sadness was
the most common emotion reported in the control
condition (30%), participants in both “in-group
support” conditions reported happiness most fre-
quently (27% for sovereignty, 30% for return). Par-
ticipants in the “return: out-group opposition” con-
dition reported anger most frequently (35%), while
themost common emotion in the “sovereignty: out-
group opposition” condition was humiliation, al-
though anger was almost equally as common (30%
and 29%, respectively).
Sacredness
A largemajority of participants considered the given
values sacred (see Table 1). In the absence of a ma-
nipulation (i.e., in the control group), sacredness
was not related to gender, West Bank versus Gaza,
or age, with one exception: the likelihood of con-
sidering sovereignty sacred increased with age (r =
0.195, P < 0.002). Our manipulation did not af-
fect sacredness: The proportion of people who
considered sovereignty sacred did not differ sig-
nificantly between control group, “sovereignty: in-
group support,” and “sovereignty: out-group oppo-
sition” conditions ( 2(2) = 0.642, P = 0.726). Nor
did the proportion of people who considered the
right of return sacred differ significantly between
control group, “return: in-group support,” and “re-
turn: out-group opposition” conditions ( 2(2) =
0.810, P = 0.670). We tested if those values that
were considered sacred were also perceived as rel-
atively more important than nonsacred values. For
this purpose, we calculated the average rank of sa-
cred values and nonsacred values for each partici-
pant in the control group only, because in the ex-
perimental groups the rankings were affected by our
manipulation.We then ran a paired sample t-test on
thesemeans: participants perceived their sacred val-
ues to be half a rank more important (M = 3.02,
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Figure 1. Relative importance of values in the control group.
SD = 1.91) than their nonsacred values (M =
3.52, SD = 2.17, t(112) = 3.181, Pone-tailed = 0.001,
d = 0.30). Note that a difference score between the
ranks of sacred and nonsacred values could only be
calculated for a participant who had at least one sa-
cred value and at least one nonsacred value. For that
reason, the sample size for this t-test was n = 113
out of the 240 participants in the control group.
Relative importance
Before analysis, we converted the ranks assigned by
each participant to a measure of the relative impor-
tance of any given value. For each participant, we
contrasted the rank of each value with the average
rank of all other values to arrive at a measure of
the relative importance of the value. For example, if
a participant assigned sovereignty a rank of 6, and
the ranks of the remaining seven values averaged
4.5, the relative importance of sovereignty for this
participant was −1.5 (i.e., 4.5–6). In other words,
this participant ranked sovereignty as 1.5 ranks less
important than the remaining seven values taken
together. This resulted in a measure easy to inter-
pret, with higher scores indicating higher relative
importance compared to the other values.
In the absence of a manipulation, Palestinians
perceived social values (e.g., protecting one’s fam-
ily) asmore important thanpolitical ones (e.g., right
of return), with sovereignty being the least impor-
tant one (see Fig. 1). The relative importance of the
given values was not correlated with the gender or
age of the participants. However, participants living
in Gaza considered “jihad against our enemies” as
more important than those living in the West Bank
(Mdiff = 0.70, SDpooled = 2.02, t(234) = 2.552, P =
0.012, d= 0.35), but they regarded “living by Sharia
law” as less important (Mdiff = 0.52, SDpooled = 1.68,
t(234) = 2.296, P = 0.023, d = 0.31).
Table 2 provides the means of the relative im-
portance of sovereignty and right of return across
conditions. To test our hypotheses about the effect
of social influence on the relative importance of sa-
cred values, we ran two regressions. For Hypothesis
1a, we ran a regression model of the relative im-
portance of sovereignty predicted by four dummy-
coded variables for the experimental conditions
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Table 2. Means (SD in parentheses) of relative importance of sovereignty and right of return across conditions
Control In-group support Out-group opposition
Sovereignty
Sacred –0.97 (1.72) –0.91 (1.95) –0.84 (1.70)
Not sacred –1.93 (1.95) –0.97 (1.59) –0.59 (1.86)
Right of return
Sacred –0.92 (1.74) –1.05 (1.66) –0.50 (1.56)
Not sacred –0.59 (1.60) –0.55 (1.87) –0.64 (1.54)
(with control group as the comparison): sacredness
of sovereignty (dummy coded 0 for nonsacred and
1 for sacred), as well as the interaction terms of “sa-
credness” and the four dummy-coded variables for
the experimental conditions (F(9, 1174) = 1.908,
P = 0.047, R2 = 0.014; see Table 3 for regression
coefficients).
In line with Hypothesis 1a, the interaction terms
of sacredness of sovereignty and both sovereignty
conditions were significant: devoted actors, that is,
those who considered sovereignty a sacred value,
were not affected by the experimental conditions;
nondevoted actors, however, perceived sovereignty
as more important when they were reminded of
support by fellow Palestinians or of opposition by
Israelis (Fig. 2). This finding was robust even when
age, gender, West Bank versus Gaza, and the emo-
tional reaction to themanipulations were entered as
controls.
To test Hypothesis 1b, we first ran a regression
of the relative importance of right of return pre-
dicted by dummy-coded variables for the experi-
mental conditions, sacredness of right of return,
and the interaction terms between sacredness and
the dummy-coded variables for the experimental
conditions. This regression model did not signifi-
cantly explain the variance in the relative impor-
tance of right of return (P= 0.494). Thus, the social-
influence manipulation did not affect the relative
importance of right of return.
Overall, these findings suggest that sacred values
are relatively immune to social influence. Palestini-
ans were not swayed by support by fellow Palestini-
ans for the established sacred value of the right of re-
turn, nor by Israeli opposition to it. Similarly, those
who held the emerging sacred value of sovereignty
over airspace and borders as sacred were also im-
mune to social influence. However, people who did
not consider sovereignty sacred did perceive it as
more important when it was supported by fellow
Palestinians or opposed by Israelis.
This relative immunity of sacred values to our
manipulations contrastswith the rational-actor per-
spective, which would predict in-group support to
increase the importance of a value but any kind of
opposition to decrease it, especially Israeli opposi-
tion because it is associated with considerable cost
for Palestinians. Interestingly, even for those who
were susceptible to social influence, Israeli opposi-
tion did not decrease the importance of sovereignty,
but increased it instead. We speculate that both
our experimental manipulations increased group
cohesiveness,51 which in turn may have led non-
devoted actors to commit more to group interests.
Devoted actors, on the other hand, may already be
aligned with the group (identity fusion52) and thus
not be affected by group cohesion.
An ongoing set of brain-imaging studies sug-
gests that there may be neural correlates to the re-
sistance of sacred values to social pressure.39 In a
follow-up to an earlier study,38 experimenters intro-
duced a social-influence manipulation at the stage
of the study when people (in this case, American
college students) are asked to choose which value
statements they identify with (e.g., “I believe in
God”). Subjects could see the percentage of fel-
low participants who agreed with them for each
statement (i.e., subjects see a “thermometer” con-
sisting of a column of five circles, where each half-
filled circle represents 10% social support from the
subject’s reference population). The study showed
that willingness to change positions on an issue
to reflect majority opinion was negatively corre-
lated with activation of the ventrolateral prefrontal
cortex (associated with rule processing) and the
amygdala (associated with emotional agitation)—
the same brain regions activated for sacred values in
Ref. 34.
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Table 3. Regression of relative importance of sovereignty on conditions and sacredness of sovereignty
B SE t P
Intercept –1.932 0.280 –6.908 <0.001
Sovereignty: in-group support 0.965 0.415 2.325 0.020
Sovereignty: out-group opposition 1.341 0.412 3.257 0.001
Right of return: in-group support 0.864 0.396 2.184 0.029
Right of return: out-group opposition 0.793 0.415 1.941 0.053
Sovereignty sacred 0.959 0.309 3.107 0.002
Return in-group support X sacred –0.672 0.436 –1.541 0.123
Return out-group opposition X sacred –0.660 0.448 –1.474 0.141
Sovereignty in-group support X sacred –0.905 0.453 –1.997 0.046
Sovereignty out-group opposition X sacred –1.212 0.450 –2.692 0.007
Study 2: Sacred values decrease perceived
temporal distance and constrain choices
We designed a study to test ideas concerning two
additional and complementaryways inwhich sacred
values may influence intergroup conflict: resistance
to temporal discounting and constraining choices
to exit the conflict.
Differences in perceived temporal distance and
temporal discounting may indicate which values
engender greater devotion than others. Much of
the work on temporal judgment has focused on
single hypothetical events that are close or far away
within a fairly limited past or future time span (e.g.,
previous or next day versus last or next year).53,54
We know little concerning distance dynamics and
associated consequences when there is a date or
event that takes on symbolic or sacred significance
(e.g., the year of Christ’s birth or Mohammed’s
flight from Mecca to Medina), a salient precedent
(e.g., the Crusades, the Holocaust, 9/11), or a
future concrete goal (e.g., an independent Kurdish
state, a government ruled by Sharia law). A com-
plementary measure of devotion to sacred values
is unwillingness to abandon such values for other
normatively important values, even when those
other values incur less personal risk, provide more
direct personal advantage, and carry important
social benefits appreciated by the community.
Many decisions require a weighing of costs and
benefits at different points in time. For instance,
political leaders may have to trade off the imple-
mentation of a disputed but important policy (with
great benefits in the future) with the risk of losing
support of their constituency now. In such situa-
tions, people have a tendency to discount the value
of costs and benefits the farther they are away from
the present (e.g., in a distant future or distant past).
In the context of intergroup conflict, negative events
in the past (such as a tragedy befalling one’s people)
may bemore effective inmotivating action if people
feel closer to those events. Likewise, positive future
events may motivate action more if they are seen as
closer at hand andmore likely to occur.We tested the
idea that devoted actors,whoconstrue issues in apo-
litical conflict as sacred, may feel temporarily closer
to sacred past and future events, effectively counter-
acting temporal discounting (Hypothesis 2a).
Additionally, we tested the idea that sacred values
may contribute to the continuation of conflicts by
constraining choices of devoted actors, so they are
more likely to reject individual exit strategies, even
when those strategies are framed in terms of duties
to the nation or to religion (Hypothesis 2b). We
tested both of these hypotheses within one survey
of Palestinian adolescents.
Methods
We conducted a survey with a representative sam-
ple of Palestinian adolescents in the West Bank and
Gaza (n= 555, ages 11–19 years, cohorts 12, 15, and
18 years, 50% female), again in cooperation with
the PCPSR. The sample procedure was identical to
the one used in Study 1, with the exception that
instead of an adult, a child was selected randomly
from each household. All questions were tested for
comprehension in a pilot study with adolescents in
the same age range. Similar to Study 1, participants
were interviewed at home, face to face, in Arabic
by trained Palestinian interviewers. The relevant
measures were embedded in a larger survey on
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Figure 2. Importance of sovereignty with perceived in-group support or out-group opposition.
political opinions, as part of which they were asked
if they consider three core issues of the conflict as
sacred (Jerusalem, right of return, recognition of
Israel) using the same measure as in Study 1.
Hypothesis 2a: temporal distance
To assess if sacred values change the perception
about the distance of relevant events, we asked par-
ticipants how close theNakba (“Catastrophe,” refer-
ring to the exodus of Palestinians as a result of the
foundation of Israel in 1948) felt to them (from 1 =
“feels like yesterday” to 10= “feels like distant past”)
and how many years ago it happened. As a point of
comparison, we also asked them the same questions
about the end of World War II (an event unlikely
to invoke sacred values for our participants). For a
future event, we also asked them to estimate how
many years they thought it would take until Pales-
tinians could “return to their former lands” in what
now is Israel.
Hypothesis 2b: exit strategies
We presented our participants with two scenarios
allowing them to escape violent conflict. We framed
options in terms of some type of moral virtue to
allow participants to think about exit strategies that
would save face. Participants were told to imagine
that there had been an invasion of “Israeli invasion
forces and a resistance is being organized.” They
were then presented with an exit strategy: we asked
them if given the opportunity they would “make a
Hajj to Mecca instead of staying to resist.” Subse-
quently, they were asked to imagine the same situa-
tion but this time with an opportunity to go “over-
seas to participate in a training program so that you
can comeback and serve your country.” Participants
indicated if they would “seriously think about” tak-
ing the opportunity (response options: “yes,” “no,”
“don’t know”).
Results and discussion
Hypothesis 2a: temporal distance
The majority of our participants (84%) considered
the right of return as sacred. On average, partici-
pants felt moderately close to theNakba (M = 4.66,
SD = 2.97), and they perceived the end of World
War II as more distant than the Nakba (Mdiff =
1.88, SDdiff = 3.22, t(505) = 13.135, P< 0.001, d =
0.58).While the temporal distance to theNakbawas
not related to the gender of the participants, older
participants perceived the Nakba to be closer (r =
−0.144,P< 0.001). Also, participants living inGaza
perceived the Nakba as closer than did those living
in the West Bank (Mdiff = 0.82, t(545) = 3.173, P =
0.002, d = 0.28).
19Ann. N.Y. Acad. Sci. 1299 (2013) 11–24 C© 2013 New York Academy of Sciences.
Sacred values in intergroup conflict Sheikh et al.
To test Hypothesis 2a, we ran an ANCOVA with
temporal distance to the Nakba as dependent vari-
ables, sacredness (dichotomous: whether partici-
pant considered right of return sacred or not) as
an independent variable, and temporal distance to
World War II as a covariate. There was a signifi-
cant effect of the covariate on the distance to the
Nakba (F(1, 503) = 85.493, P < 0.001). Not sur-
prisingly, participants who felt closer to the end
of WWII also felt closer to the Nakba. In line
with Hypothesis 2a, there was a significant ef-
fect of sacredness on the distance to the Nakba
(F(1, 503) = 5.206, P = 0.023). Controlling for
the distance to World War II, devoted actors felt
Mdiff = 0.73 points closer to the Nakba compared
to those who did not consider the right of return
as sacred. This finding was robust even when age,
gender, and West Bank versus Gaza were entered as
controls.
Asked to estimate the years that have passed since
the Nakba, a majority of participants gave an es-
timate very close to the correct amount of years
(i.e., 63 years). Nevertheless, we conducted the same
analysis as above, this time with years since the
Nakba as the dependent variable. Again, there was
a significant effect of the covariate (F(1, 452) =
31.816, P < 0.001). The more years participants
thought had passed since the end of World War II,
the more years they thought had passed since the
Nakba. However, controlling for the years since the
end of World War II, there was no significant ef-
fect of sacredness, P = 0.965: devoted actors did
not differ from others when it comes to their es-
timates of the years that have passed since the
Nakba.
Asked in howmany years Palestinians will be able
to return to their former lands, participants had the
option to indicate “never.” Devoted actors were sig-
nificantly less likely to respond “never” (17%) than
those who did not consider the right of return as
sacred (26% ( 2(2) = 3.052, Pone-tailed = 0.040)).
Among those who did expect Palestinians to return,
devoted actors estimated that Palestinians will be
able to return earlier (M = 15.79, SD = 20.11) than
those who did not consider the right of return as sa-
cred (M = 20.65, SD = 23.40). This effect was only
marginally significant (t(358) = 1.594, Pone-tailed =
0.056). Nevertheless, we can have fairly high confi-
dence in this finding inasmuch as it did not include
the people who thought Palestinians will never re-
turn to their former lands, and the proportion of
such people was lower in devoted actors than in
nondevoted ones.
Together the findings show that devoted actors
feel that events related to their sacred values are
closer to them, be they past or future events. This
effect does not stem from a factual mistake on when
past events took place historically, as devoted ac-
tors recalled the correct numbers of years since
the Nakba just as well as others did. These results
suggest that sacred values counteract the effects
of temporal discounting on decision making over
associated events. Additionally, sacred values may
lead to shrinking, disappearance or even reversal of
standard effects of psychological distance on pref-
erences and actions (construal level theory53) for
objects, events, and persons associated with sacred
values.
Hypothesis 2b: exit strategies
Turning down opportunities to exit the conflict is
not tied to specific sacred values, like the right of
return. Therefore, we compared moral absolutists,
that is, those who held all issues we assessed (East
Jerusalem, right of return, and recognition of Israel)
as sacred values (in our sample, 76%) to those who
considered twoor fewer of these issues sacred.Moral
absolutists were significantly more likely to refuse
making the Hajj over resisting Israeli occupation
(75%) than those who did not consider all issues sa-
cred (61% ( 2(2)= 3.524, Pone-tailed = 0.030)). Sim-
ilarly, the likelihood that moral absolutists would
refuse going abroad for training instead of joining
the resistance (65%) was significantly higher than
of nonabsolutists (56% ( 2(1) = 9.364, Pone-tailed =
0.001)).
In summary, compared to thosewho did not con-
sider the right of return as sacred, devoted actors
did feel closer to theNakba than to the end ofWorld
War II.Theyalso considered itmore likely thatPales-
tinians will return to their former lands in what now
is Israel, and they expected this return to occur ear-
lier. Moral absolutists (those who considered all of
the issues as sacred) were also more likely to refuse
opportunities to exit the conflict (and abandon re-
sistance to Israeli occupation) than were nonabso-
lutists, even if the opportunities would also morally
serve God (Hajj) or country (training), but in ways
unrelated to conflict.
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Discussion
In developing a more comprehensive picture of sa-
cred values, we hypothesized that for devoted actors
driven by such values under conditions of conflict,
there would be resistance to social influence, tem-
poral discounting, and exit strategies (based in part
on theoretical arguments developed in Ref. 10). We
examined data for the Palestinian case and found
confirmation of our hypotheses. Future research
will determine whether our hypotheses also hold
for Israelis on the other side the conflict, as we ex-
pect given our previous research showing parallel
attachments to sacred values on both sides of the
Israel–Palestine divide with regard to immunity to
trade-offs, the backfire effect, insensitivity to quan-
tity, and so forth.11,26,54 Our previous research (re-
viewed in Ref. 12) also lead us to anticipate that
findings for the Israel–Palestine conflict may well
extend to other cultural and political contexts in-
volving deep-seated intergroup conflict.
In Study 1, we found that when people hold a
value to be sacred, and behave as devoted actors on
issues related to that value, the priority they give
the value is relatively resistant to social pressure.
In Study 2, we found preliminary evidence that for
events associated with sacred values, the psycho-
logical perception of temporal distance can shrink
significantly: Palestinians who viewed the right of
return to their former lands as sacred (compared to
other Palestinians) perceived the Nakba to be tem-
porally closer than the end of World War II. They
also estimated the time when a return will be possi-
ble to be closer. These findings suggest the possibil-
ity that, even as implementation of sacred values is
delayed (perhaps bypolitical leaders anddevoted ac-
tivists) in order tomeet responsibilities, the psycho-
logical distance to those values may remain small,
ensuring that commitment to them does not fade.
Finally, we found that devoted actors were signif-
icantly less likely than nondevoted actors to express
willingness to take an opportunity to exit the con-
flict: Palestinians who considered core issues of the
conflict as sacred were reliably less inclined to aban-
don or delay their duty to resist occupation in ex-
change for acting in accordance with a sacred value
unrelated to personal risk or group threat (under-
taking theHajj) or for accomplishing an action con-
sidered important but not sacred (personal training
to better serve the country). Notice that our test of
exit strategies involved inducements internal to the
group. We expect future research to show that in-
ducements offered by out-groups will be even less
attractive, no matter how lucrative or beneficial to
the person.
These new findings complement previous work
demonstrating the way sacred values can influ-
ence the trajectory of intergroup conflict. In previ-
ous laboratory experiments, including brain imag-
ing studies—supported by field work with political
leaders, revolutionaries, terrorists, and others—we
have shown sacred values to be at the core of per-
sonal and social identity (“who I am” and “who
we are”).10,13,34,46 Sacred values appear to be pro-
cessed as moral rules, duties, and obligations that
defy the utilitarian and instrumental calculations
of realpolitik or the marketplace. Findings indicate
that sacred values are immune tomaterial trade-offs
and insensitive to quantity (e.g., God loves equally
a martyr who kills 100, 1000, or none of the en-
emy because it is the commitment to the cause that
counts).23,32 Sacred values also have privileged links
to emotions, such as anger and disgust at their viola-
tion, leading tomoral outrage and increased support
for violence.11,20,21,35,55,56 People defending a sacred
value will resist trading it off for any number of
material benefits, or even for peace.
The sacred values of devoted actors, it turns
out, generate action independent of calculated risks,
costs, and consequences—a direct contradiction of
prevailing rational-actormodels of politics and eco-
nomics, which focus on material interests. Devoted
actors, in contrast, act because they sincerely and
deeply believe “it’s the right thing to do,” regard-
less of risks or rewards. The difference concerns the
distinct cognitive processes associated with the for-
mation (and perhaps fusion, see Ref. 52) of per-
sonal and in-group identity among devoted actors,
which places desired expectations that are associ-
ated with securing that identity—as a matter of
moral conviction—above rational and calculated
analysis of potential problems and flaws in a pol-
icy or decision. Practically, this means that devoted
actors often harness deep and abiding social and
political commitments to confront much stronger
foes. Think of the American revolutionaries, who
were willing to devote “our lives, our fortunes, and
our sacred honor” in the fight for liberty against
the greatest military power of the age, or modern
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suicide bombers willing to sacrifice everything for
their cause.57
Sacred values—like the transformation of land
into “Holy Land”—sustain the commitment of rev-
olutionaries and militant groups to resist, and of-
ten overcome,more numerous and better-equipped
militaries and police that function with measured
rewards like better pay or promotion. Research
with political leaders and general populations also
shows that sacred values—not political games or
economics—underscore intractable conflicts like
those between the Israelis and the Palestinians
that defy the rational give-and-take of business-
like negotiation.11,23,26–28 Field experiments in Is-
rael, Palestine, Nigeria, and the United States in-
dicate that commitment to such values can moti-
vate and sustain wars beyond reasonable costs and
casualties.14 Perhapsmost importantly, this research
helps to explain why efforts to broker peace that rely
on money or other material incentives are doomed
when core values clash. In our studies with col-
leagues in Afghanistan, India, Indonesia, Iran, the
Levant, and North Africa, we found that offers of
material incentives to compromise on sacred values
often backfire, actually increasing anger and vio-
lence toward a deal.12
Leaders and activists, who are highly identified
with the group and may perceive group interests as
sacred values, may seek to deepen commitment to
their sacred values among followers and the gen-
eral population through cognitive and behavioral
means that promote a deeper internalization of val-
ues so as to immunize them from normative influ-
ences. Our previous research suggests that whereas
some conflicts start over issues that are considered
historically sacred, initially mundane issues can be-
come sacralized in protracted conflicts under con-
ditions of heightened perceptions of threat, espe-
cially if these issues are also implicated in religious
ritual and rhetoric.41 Thus, the very opposition by
the international community and the sanctions im-
posed upon Iran, together with the Iranian regime’s
ratcheting up the psychological effects of this op-
position with religious rhetoric, may be significant
factors behind the fact that the Iranian nuclear en-
ergy program is emerging as a sacred value in Iran
among a minority of the population, but one that
is close to the regime and bound up through reli-
gious rhetoric with national identity and even Islam
itself.27,28
In sum,ourprevious research showed thatheight-
ened perception of outside threats and intensifica-
tion of in-group religious ritual and rhetoric helps
to sacralize disputed values. Here, we have pre-
sented findings that suggest that once values are
sacralized and associated with conditions of inter-
group conflict, people will adhere to them regard-
less of social pressures, considerations of time, or
the benefits associated with other important values
and available courses of action and exit. As Dar-
win noted in the Descent of Man,58 for a given
group in conflict with other groups, the key to
victory is the willingness of at least some mem-
bers to sacrifice even their lives (the totality of
their self-interests) in anapparently irrational blind-
ness to plausible exit strategies and alternatives.
It is this commitment that we have associated in
our research with sacred values: that is, the virtue
of “morality . . . the spirit of patriotism, fidelity,
obedience, courage, and sympathy,” which Dar-
win believed enabled groups endowed with such
devoted actors to resist and triumph over other
groups (even those with materially greater means)
in history’s spiraling competition for survival and
dominance. Understanding the role of sacred values
in the apparently intractable conflicts of today, in
an era of globalized politics and weapons of mass
destruction, may indeed be critical to our group
welfare.
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